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Member countries of a currency union like the euro area have absorbed asym-
metric shocks in ways that are inconsistent with a common nominal anchor.
Based on a reformulation of the gravity model that allows for such bilateral
misalignment, we disentangle the conventional microeconomic trade effect and
macroeconomic trade effects deriving from bilateral misalignment within cur-
rency unions. Econometric estimation reveals that for the euro area the mis-
alignment channel exerts a significant trade effect on bilateral exports. We
retrieve country-specific estimates of the misalignment-induced effect on trade
which demonstrate heterogeneous outlooks across countries for the costs and
benefits from adopting the euro.
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1 Introduction
Forming, or joining, a monetary union will always involve a trade-off between the
benefit of less costly transactions for intra-union trade and the potential cost of
macroeconomic imbalances caused by loss of monetary autonomy. Ex ante, for some
countries the loss of monetary autonomy might seem a benefit in that the union
might serve as a commitment device for a more stability-oriented price- and wage-
setting behavior. Ex post, however, this disciplinary force will most likely be felt as
a pain, and commitment will turn out to be imperfectly credible. Attempts to avoid
this pain will then lead to macroeconomic imbalances, caused by the impossibility of
nominal exchange rate adjustments leading to misalignments of real exchange rates
between member countries. Macroeconomic imbalances, in turn, can take the form
of internal balance (full employment) or external balance (current account in line
with solvency), or combinations of both.1 The theory of optimum currency areas
tries to identify conditions under which the risk of such imbalances is low; see Silva
and Tenreyro (2010). But in all likelihood, real world currency unions will entail
non-trivial costs in terms of endogenous macroeconomic imbalances that could have
been avoided with separate currencies.
There is a vast literature, sparked off by Rose (2000), which tries to quantify how
much additional trade may be expected from a common currency on the grounds of
less costly transactions. Various approaches have been proposed, but the dominant
approach is based on the gravity model of bilateral trade.2 The empirical estimates
obtained vary a lot, but it is probably fair to say that the very large effect initially
estimated by Rose (2000), indicating that a currency union triples trade between
its member countries, has meanwhile given way to much lower expectations.3 A
pervasive feature of this literature is that it estimates the trade effects of a common
currency independently of whether the union has also caused macroeconomic imbal-
ances. The theory of optimum currency areas emphasizes that the loss from foregone
monetary autonomy is lower with high bilateral volumes of trade between the coun-
tries considered. But there is also a reverse influence, meaning that macroeconomic
imbalances caused by loss of nominal exchange rate flexibility will trigger trade ef-
fects. Somewhat surprisingly, the empirical literature ignores this feedback effect.
1This invokes the classic view of macroeconomic equilibrium first proposed by Meade (1951)
and later refined by Corden (1994).
2For an alternative approach using treatment analysis, see Persson (2001). For a survey, see
Silva and Tenreyro (2010).
3See again the survey by Silva and Tenreyro (2010).
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Arguably, this is not for lack of knowledge, but for lack of a workable empirical
approach to identify this macroeconomic channel of trade effects.
In this paper, we develop such an approach by a suitable extension of the gravity
equation. We apply our approach to the euro area which seems like an ideal “show
case” to demonstrate the importance of the issue and the virtues of our approach.
The run-up to the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) of the European Union
(EU) was characterized by a big aspiration and a big concern. The aspiration was
that a common currency would reinvigorate the single market programme by estab-
lishing more cross-country transparency, wiping out all exchange rate uncertainty,
and lowering administrative cost of intra-European trade. It was expected that this
should enhance cross-border competition and deliver further gains from trade. The
concern was that imposing a common nominal anchor on countries that face asym-
metric shocks, or have different mechanisms of macroeconomic shock absorption,
would lead to macroeconomic imbalances or else compromise long-run stability of
that anchor. It was all too obvious that the countries in question would not sat-
isfy optimum currency area (OCA) criteria. Therefore, in order to allay fears of
a high-inflation euro zone, ex ante macroeconomic convergence was installed as a
prerequisite for membership in the currency union. The famous Maastricht entry
criteria were meant to guarantee the ability of all member countries to live with a
stable common nominal anchor ex post. In addition, the Stability and Growth Pact
(SGP) has installed a rule of conduct, in order to ensure that the stability of this
anchor would not be jeopardized from member countries’ waning fiscal discipline.
After more than a decade, we now have a wealth of evidence to judge whether
the aspirations have been met and the concerns have been justified. On the macroe-
conomic side, the verdict seems split. On the one hand, the European Central Bank
(ECB) was undeniably successful in quickly establishing a stable nominal anchor for
the entire euro zone; see Wyplosz (2006). On the other hand, member countries’
longer-term abilities to live with this anchor in some cases are in serious doubt,
judged from the build-up of macro-level imbalances within the euro area. A de-
tailed report by the European Commission highlights sizable misalignments of real
exchange rates within the euro zone, caused primarily by nominal wages in some
member countries drifting away from their equilibrium levels, as implied by the
common nominal anchor; see EU-Commission (2009).4
4More recently, the euro zone has come under severe stress from internal balance of payments
crises that several of its member countries are experiencing, due to large current account deficits
that can no longer be financed through private capital imports, or due to capital flight. These
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On the single market aspirations, the verdict might draw on evidence of a trade-
enhancing effect of the euro. While the famous tripling estimate which Rose (2000)
has found for pre-euro currency unions has never been confirmed for the euro area,
early literature has estimated positive effects on bilateral trade for the euro area as
well. For instance, Micco et al. (2003) has reported trade effects in the vicinity of
15%. Yet, subsequent studies have revealed that a large part of this effect was due to
somewhat flawed econometrics. More recent estimates, based on refined econometric
techniques, reveal an effect barely above zero; see Baldwin et al. (2008), Baldwin
(2010) and Silva and Tenreyro (2010). Arguably, this is disappointing, given the
painful ex ante convergence that many countries have undergone in order to qualify
for euro membership, and given the restraints on fiscal autonomy implied by the
Stability and Growth Pact.
Estimates of trade effects close to zero are also disappointing against the back-
drop of modern trade theory which emphasizes a number of different channels
through which adopting a common currency should increase trade volumes between
partner countries. These channels mostly work through lower transaction costs or
lower “beachhead costs” of entering foreign markets via exports or FDI. According to
recent trade models, such cost savings should exert trade effects that go beyond the
traditional view that trade increases mainly through lower trade cost components
in c.i.f.-prices of traded goods; see Baldwin (2010). Additional effects include lower
market power and lower markups as well as the so-called extensive margin of trade,
meaning the emergence of new first-time exporters, or exporting firms extending the
range of products exported and/or the number of foreign markets served. In this
paper we speak of these effects, in their entirety, as the microeconomic trade effects
of a currency union.
Whatever the details of such microeconomic effects, if relevant they should show
up in empirical estimates of the gravity model of trade, provided that the esti-
mated equation is correctly specified. Strikingly, while much effort has gone into
refining the econometric specification of the gravity model used, existing studies
have completely ignored the potential trade impact of macroeconomic imbalances
caused by the monetary union. The implicit assumption underlying all existing lit-
crises have been caused, not so much by nominal cost divergencies, but by unsustainable paths of
general government deficits, whether as a result of the financial crisis of 2007/08 (as in Ireland and
Spain) or resulting from deeper-lying structural problems related to the respective government’s
budget (as in Greece, Portugal or Italy). However, in this paper we do not intend to contribute to
the discussion of the present crisis. Instead, our focus squarely lies with macroeconomic imbalances
caused by nominal cost divergencies within the euro zone.
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erature apparently is that macroeconomic imbalances, potentially accumulating due
to the absence of nominal exchange rate flexibility, have no bearing on gravity-based
estimates of microeconomic effects. Yet, barring an explicit treatment of such im-
balances in the gravity model, this assumption must remain dubious. And even if it
is correct, microeconomic effects do not tell us the full story, if trade is additionally
affected by macroeconomic imbalances caused by monetary union.
In this paper we aim at two contributions. First, we develop an “augmented
version” of the gravity model with explicit treatment of bilateral nominal cost di-
vergencies and nominal exchange rates. A macroeconomic imbalance arises if cost
divergencies are not fully offset by corresponding adjustments of nominal exchange
rates. Trade flows as determined by our augmented gravity model in the absence of
such imbalances are called “gravity norm” levels of trade. The conventional trade
cost effect of a common currency is then defined as shifting these gravity norm levels
of trade. In turn, macroeconomic imbalances are responsible for deviations form the
gravity norm, and if such imbalances are caused by the currency union, then this
constitutes a second important trade effect of the currency union.
Our augmented gravity model allows us to do two things. First, we identify con-
ditions under which microeconomic effects may be estimated consistently by gravity
methods, if trade is in fact subject to macroeconomic imbalances, as in the first
decade of the euro zone. And secondly, it allows us to frame a very simple and intu-
itive question in terms of the gravity equation: Do bilateral cost divergencies affect
trade flows more heavily if the two trading partners belong to the same monetary
union than if they have separate currencies? If the answer is yes, this indicates that
the lack of nominal exchange rate adjustment between countries of the union is a
binding constraint leading to misalignments of real exchange rates with attendant
trade effects.
The second contribution of the paper is to bring our augmented gravity model to
the data, using the first decade of evidence with the euro zone. A principal problem
with the augmented model is that gravity norm levels of trade are unobservable, if
trade is in fact subject to misalignments. We develop a two-stage estimation strategy
to solve this problem. In the first stage, we secure reliable estimates of the param-
eters that drive the microeconomic, or trade cost channel, in the gravity equation.
A key insight from our theoretical model is that this can be done using standard
gravity methods, irrespective of currency misalignment and without knowing un-
observable gravity norm trade levels. Our empirical result here is in line with the
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consensus in the literature, which holds that the euro as such has had but a minor
influence on trade by lowering real trade costs; see Baldwin et al. (2008), Baldwin
(2010) and Silva and Tenreyro (2010). More importantly, however, stage one allows
us to compute a complete matrix of estimated bilateral trade costs for each sample
period. We then use these estimates, together with extraneous information, in or-
der to calibrate gravity norm levels of trade from the equilibrium conditions of our
gravity model.
With the gravity norm thus tied down numerically, stage two of our strategy turns
to empirical estimation of the full augmented gravity model which focuses on the
macroeconomic channel. Our augmented model relies on a relatively general view on
nominal exchange rate formation in the face of bilateral nominal cost divergencies.
Estimation of the model then tells us whether such cost divergencies systematically
affect trade for euro member countries differently, compared to trading partners
with separate currencies where a nominal exchange rate adjustment may absorb
such divergencies. Our empirical results suggest an affirmative answer. Based on
our estimation results, we are then able to portray a picture of country-heterogeneity
in trade effects of the euro, reflecting the difficulties that different member countries
have had in coming to terms with a stable nominal anchor enforced by a common
monetary policy.
Although our paper is motivated by the unique experiment of the euro, the
contributions of the paper command much more general relevance. Currency mis-
alignments are a widespread phenomenon not restricted to currency unions. Actual
currency regimes are characterized by varying degrees of tightness with which cur-
rencies of different countries are tied to each other. Egger (2008) uses the classifi-
cation established by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) to show that increasing exchange
rate tightness (on a scale ranging from 1 to 14) tends to increase trade. This gets
rid of the dichotomy underlying the original study by Rose and almost the entire
subsequent literature. We would interpret this result as representing a trade cost ef-
fect, although it seems unclear why moving to a tighter currency arrangement while
leaving national currencies in place should reduce transactions or beachhead cost
of trade. However, it does seem plausible that increasing exchange rate tightness
should increase the likelihood of currency misalignment of the type that we high-
light in this paper. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt
to augment the gravity model in order to disentangle the trade cost channel of cur-
rency arrangements from the currency misalignments channel, and to investigate
whether misalignment-induced trade effects are endogenous to the exchange rate
5
arrangement.
Our paper fundamentally differs from other papers in the literature that have
included exchange rate effects in the gravity equation. These papers usually demon-
strate a very straightforward negative trade effect of real exchange rate appreciations
on trade; see Micco et al. (2003) and Flam and Nordström (2007). Our concern,
however, is fundamentally different. First, our concern is misalignment of real ex-
change rates, not real exchange rates as such. And we develop a theoretical gravity
model which incorporates a precise definition of misalignment. Secondly, and more
importantly, our main concern is whether such misalignments are endogenous to
the formation of a currency union. And our augmented gravity model allows us to
answer this question by means of empirical estimation. Our results suggest that
conventional estimates of the microeconomic trade effects as such, while correct for
an “average member country”, are of limited interest for any individual country.
They combine with misalignment-induced effects which by definition are asymmet-
ric across countries. Our contribution therefore also goes beyond the work by Berger
and Nitsch (2010), which documents real exchange rate effects on trade balances in
periods of less flexible or fixed exchange rates, but offers no theoretical underpinning,
nor explicit empirical conclusions regarding country heterogeneity.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section motivates our analysis by
showing descriptive evidence on misalignments in the euro area. Section 3 then
develops the augmented gravity model. In section 4 we first describe the data and
estimation methods, followed by an implementation of our two-stage estimation
strategy. Section 4 also presents a detailed picture of country-heterogeneity and
some checks for robustness. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Descriptive evidence on misalignment
Before we proceed with a refinement of gravity-modeling and estimation, we take
a quick look at the data, in order to demonstrate that we are talking about a
phenomenon of empirical importance. We calculate bilateral measures of nominal
cost-divergence which may be thought of as approximations to c(wit)/c(wjt), where
w.t denotes a vector of nominal factor prices (e.g., wages) prevailing in euro area
countries i and j, respectively, at time t, and c(·) denotes a minimum unit-cost
function for a common (aggregate) output. For ease of exposition we assume c(·)
to be the same for each country, but this is in no way crucial for what we are
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doing.5 Considering that within the euro area nominal exchange rate adjustments
are no longer possible, any upward or downward trend in these measures of relative
unit-cost must be seen as an intra-euro “currency misalignment”.
We focus on total-economy unit labor costs, relying on data from the Orga-
nization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). These measures,
representing the average cost of labor per unit of output, can be seen as a reflec-
tion of a country’s cost competitiveness.6 Germany and Italy are good cases in
point. Figure 1 shows the values of c(wit)/c(wjt), where the left-hand panel sets
i = Germany and the right-hand panel sets i = Italy, with j indicating other euro
members in either case. We set the index base-year to 1999, thus assuming that the
euro entry exchange rates at the start were roughly in line with bilateral purchasing
power, defined as equality of unit-cost in common currency. The figure clearly shows
that the currency misalignment was not a “dead channel” for trade between the two
countries and the other euro area members. Germany has experienced significant
real depreciation vis à vis all other countries, indicating substantial gains in relative
competitiveness. For Italy, the picture is a little less clear cut, but in the majority
of cases it has experienced a sizable real appreciation and a loss in relative compet-
itiveness. In a bilateral trade context, we would then expect exports from Germany
to Italy to rise above, while those from Italy to Germany would fall, relative to what
we will subsequently call the gravity norm level of bilateral trade.
Table 3 presents evidence for the rest of the euro area. The values in the first
column refer to export-weighted averages over all euro area partner countries in
the year 2007; the second column explicitly shows the change in the respective
values since 1999. The table documents a considerable degree of divergence in
bilateral unit labor costs across countries in the euro zone. We conclude that there
is a multiple and varied pattern of bilateral misalignment. Living with a common
nominal anchor has proven less trouble-free ex post than was hoped for ex ante.
In view of the above considerations, this strongly suggests a euro-induced effect of
implicit currency misalignment on bilateral trade that should be taken into account
5The crucial assumption is that we compare country-specific nominal unit cost for a common
(aggregate) good. It is immaterial whether an upward or downward trend in the above measure is
caused by asymmetric technological improvements that are not fully passed on to factor prices, or
by diverging factor prices which are not mandated by underlying technological improvements.
6This measure of competitiveness is not fully comprehensive. Changes in the cost of capital
should be considered as well when assessing the overall competitiveness of a country. However, in
the euro area interest rates are set by the ECB for all members while labor market policies remain
within the realm of national governments. Hence, focusing on labor costs seems warranted.
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Figure 1: Unit labor cost relative to other euro-area countries
Note: Figure shows the development of relative unit labor costs since
the introduction of the euro for Germany and Italy, respectively.
when estimating the trade effect in a gravity context.
A remaining concern is whether the new currency arrangement indeed stands for
a strong break with the monetary past of the respective countries. In particular, from
a legal perspective, exchange rates where far from a free float under the European
Monetary System (EMS) even before the currency union was formed. However, the
bands within which national currencies were allowed to fluctuate still provided ample
opportunity for exchange rate adjustments, in order to compensate for diverging
nominal cost conditions.7
7The European Monetary System (EMS) has allowed nominal exchange rates to fluctuate within
a band of 4.5% in the time from 1979 through 1993. Italy was an exception and was allowed to
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Table 1: Currency misalignment by country












Notes: Table shows (export-weighted) averages of
relative unit labor costs across all other euro member
countries. Values are normalized to 1 in 1999.
3 An augmented gravity model
In the introduction, we have argued that the formation of a currency union poten-
tially affects trade in two distinct ways. The first is the so-called microeconomic
channel where a common currency lowers the costs of opening up and operating
trading relationships across member countries. The second is what we call the
misalignment-channel. It comes into play whenever member countries of a currency
union experience trends in their nominal unit-costs that would normally tend to
cause nominal exchange rate adjustments, but now give rise to misalignment of real
exchange rates because the common currency rules out such adjustments. Both
channels are well understood in principle, but the literature on the trade effects
of the euro has exclusively focused on the microeconomic channel, although mis-
alignment was a widespread phenomenon in the first decade of the euro zone, as
demonstrated in the preceding section. In this section, we develop a reformulation
widen this band to 6%. Following a massive disruption in 1993, the band was further widened to
15%. Note also that not all countries in the sample were at all times members of the EMS. In
particular, Austria joined in 1995, Finland in 1996 and Greece in 1998.
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of the gravity model of trade, typically used in this literature, so that both chan-
nels are present on an equal footing. The principal concern motivating our effort
is that a complete neglect of the misalignment channel may undermine the validity
and correct interpretation of existing estimates relating to the microeconomic effect.
In any case, they do not tell us the full story. In the subsequent section, we will
therefore empirically implement and estimate our augmented version of the gravity
model, which allows us to disentangle and quantify both channels and thus to tell a
more complete story of the trade effects of the euro.
3.1 Microeconomic effects and the gravity norm
We view the microeconomic channel of a common currency as affecting what we call
the gravity norm volumes of trade. The gravity norm, in turn, is defined as bilateral
trade flows that emerge from a generalized gravity model with explicit introduction
of national currencies, if all exchange rates satisfy a specific condition of bilateral
purchasing power parity. The misalignment channel then gives rise to deviations
from these gravity norm trade levels, whenever currency valuations violate bilateral
purchasing power parity. In this subsection we introduce the gravity norm, and the
next subsection will model the misalignment-channel.
Derivation of the gravity norm equation for bilateral trade volumes follows the
standard approach, but it explicitly takes into account the existence of multiple cur-
rencies. Suppose we have the usual Dixit-Stiglitz-type underpinning of the gravity
approach. As is well known, this features product differentiation on the firm level,
with a zero profit equilibrium driven by monopolistic markups and free entry of
firms. Denoting the c.i.f.-price in country j for a variety arriving from country i by
pij, the quantity of demand Dij for this variety in country j is
Dij = Yj (Pj)
σ−1 (pij)
−σ , (1)
where σ > 1 denotes a uniform elasticity of substitution between different varieties
of goods. In this expression, Yj is equal to country j’s GDP, and Pj is the exact







where Ni is the number of varieties produced by country i. Importantly, all variables
on the right-hand side of (1) are in country j’s currency. Notice that in replacing
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expenditure levels through GDP, we assume total trade to be balanced. This as-
sumption will have to be relaxed when allowing for currency misalignment below.
Suppose that in each country there are K primary factors, and assume that all
input use is in terms of the same bundle of primary inputs. We model this by means
of a concave, constant-returns-to-scale function g(v), where v denotes a vector of
factor inputs employed in order to generate the input bundle. More specifically,
we assume that production of a variety requires a fixed amount f and a constant
amount a of this bundle per unit of output. For ease of exposition, we assume
technology to be uniform across all countries, although our results in no way hinge
on this assumption. We assume that all firms have the same productivity in terms
of both marginal and fixed cost. Variable and fixed cost in country i then depend
on country i’s factor prices. Writing c(w) for the minimum unit-cost function dual
to g(v), nominal cost conditions in domestic currency are governed by ci = c (wi),
where wi denotes a K × 1 vector of nominal factor prices in country i.
Arguably, monetary stability over time requires that the purchasing power of a
unit of money over the inputs required to generate a unit of aggregate output should
remain constant. We therefore define a stable nominal anchor as a constant level
of c(w).8 By analogy, we define bilateral purchasing power parity (PPP) between
countries i and j as a situation where both countries have the same nominal cost of
generating a unit level of the bundle g(v), if expressed in the same currency unit.
Using Eij to denote the price of currency i in units of currency j, the PPP level










The second equation uses linear homogeneity of the minimum unit-cost function.
Notice that with M different currencies there are M − 1 independent exchange
rates. If PPP holds between countries i and j, as well as between i and k, then it
also holds for countries j and k.




as the factor of bilateral currency misalignment. If mij = 1 for all i and j, then
there is no currency misalignment, and for any i and j we have Eijc(wi) = c(wj).
8This avoids dependence of the nominal anchor on the degree of variety offered in goods mar-
kets, which would arise if we were to use the unit-expenditure function P as a purchasing power
benchmark.
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For the remainder of this paper, we adopt currency 1 as our numéraire currency. If
Eij = Ẽij for all currency pairs, then the minimum-unit-cost of the factor bundle
g(v) is the same world-wide: (EijEj1) c(wi) = c(w1).
9 All possible countries of
origin for any country j’s imports then have the same underlying cost conditions,
governed by real forces like productivity. Obviously, this holds irrespective of which
currency we choose as the numéraire. The gravity norm satisfies full neutrality of
money.
The markup pricing condition of firms acting under monopolistic competition
implies that the c.i.f.-price of a typical variety exported from i to j, measured in




, with ρ := (σ − 1)/σ < 1. (5)
For simplicity, we scale units such that a = 1. In this equation, Tij denotes the
familiar “iceberg-cost-term” that represents trade barriers and transaction costs fa-
miliar from a typical gravity equation, as well as the currency arrangement for trade
between countries i and j. The presumption is that Tij is lower if they use a common
currency.
Using a tilde to denote gravity norm values of variables that satisfy bilateral PPP
as defined in (3), and expressing all nominal variables in the numéraire currency 1,
we may write the mill price of a typical variety produced in country i as p̃i ≡ piEi1 =
c(w1)/ρ. The c.i.f. price of this variety in country j is p̃ij ≡ Tij p̃i = Tijc(w1)/ρ, and
















Moreover, country i’s gravity norm GDP may be written as
Ỹi = Ñiqip̃i = Ñiqic(w1)/ρ, (7)
where Ñi and qi are the number of varieties and the output level per variety, respec-
tively, that country i observes in a zero-profit equilibrium of monopolistic competi-
tion. Notice that we allow the gravity norm number of firms, Ñi, to be different from
the actual number of firms in a misalignment-ridden equilibrium, which we shall de-
9Bilateral PPP implies that nominal cost in country i, expressed in j-currency is Eijc(wi) =
c(wj). It also implies that the nominal cost in country j, expressed in country 1’s currency is
Ej1c(wj) = c(w1). Taken together, this implies EijEj1c(wi) = c(w1) for all i and j.
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note by Ni. In contrast, the level of output per firm is assumed to be the same in the
gravity norm and the misalignment-ridden equilibrium, denoted by qi. The reason is
as follows. Assuming that the fixed cost f and variable cost a are given in terms of
the same input bundle g(v), qi is determined independently of currency valuations
as qi = f(σ − 1)/a. The gravity norm number of firms then is Ñi = g(vi)/(fσ).
This follows from free entry and the full employment condition, respectively. Since
currency misalignment potentially leads to actual employment levels below vi, the
number of firms in a misalignment-ridden equilibrium will typically deviate from Ñi;
see below.
World commodity market clearing implies qi =
∑
j D̃ijTij. Following Anderson
and Van Wincoop (2003), we may now solve for the gravity norm mill price for coun-
try i, p̃i, by inserting the market equilibrium condition into the definition of gravity































Going back to the demand function (1), and writing X̃ij for the gravity norm value



































Equations (9) and (11) capture what Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) call “mul-
tilateral trade resistance”. Since there are M countries, these two relationships form
a system of 2M nonlinear equations that describe how each country i is positioned
in terms of real trade costs Tij vis à vis the entirety of its trading partners, both as
an importer (P̃i) and as an exporter (Π̃i). It is relatively obvious that with complete
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symmetry of real trade costs, meaning Tij = Tji, we have P̃i = Π̃i and the system
reduces to M equations. We henceforth assume symmetry in real trade costs.
This completes the gravity model under bilateral purchasing power parity, i.e.,
the gravity norm. Note that mill prices of varieties produced in different countries,
p̃i, have disappeared since we have assumed a uniform required input a = 1 in terms
of the factor bundle g(v), as well as an equal minimum unit cost of g(v), measured
in terms of our numéraire currency 1. All variables, including exporter and importer
country GDPs as well as world GDP, are measured in this currency.
Our maintained hypothesis now is that Tij will be lower if countries i and j
use a common currency, due to the microeconomic effects briefly discussed in the
introduction. To identify this effect in an econometric estimation relying on gravity
norm data, we would only need to introduce an indicator variable for country pairs
with a common currency when specifying a relationship between Tij and the relevant
trade barrier variables, including the familiar gravity controls such as distance and
contiguity. However, as we have emphasized in the previous section, the first decade
of the euro has witnessed nominal cost conditions evolving in massive violation of (3).
Hence, we cannot estimate the gravity norm model of trade. To arrive at a workable
empirical approach, we must now develop an augmented version of the gravity model
that allows for misalignment-induced deviations from the gravity norm.
3.2 The misalignment channel
To clarify our point, we first consider possible causes of implicit currency misalign-
ment in a currency union. Deviations from the gravity norm may arise due to asym-
metric shocks, or different shock absorption mechanisms across countries. Consider,
for instance, different countries’ response to asymmetric endowment or technology
shocks, if they are subject to a downward rigidity of some nominal factor price, say
the wage rate for low-skilled labor. Depending on the endowment shock, however,
full employment may require a reduction in the unskilled wage rate, relative to other
factor prices. One way to achieve this without a nominal wage cut is to allow for
inflation of all factor prices. It is easy to see that this may give rise to misalignment.
More specifically, using vik to denote country i’s endowment with factor k (k =
1 . . . K) and using subscripts to indicate gradients of the minimum unit-cost func-
tions, full employment of all factors implies that relative factor prices satisfy the
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for k = 2 . . . K. (12)
This simply states that for all possible factor pairs the cost-minimizing input ra-
tios in production of aggregate output are in line with the corresponding relative
endowments.10 Suppose that the common nominal anchor requires c(w) = 1, and











common currency, and satisfying equilibrium conditions (12). Moreover, suppose







and assume that country j can absorb this through full employment factor prices
w
1






= 1. A case of misalignment may then arise, if for country i a
change in factor prices that satisfies both, (12) and c (w1i ) = 1, is inconsistent with
the downward rigidity of some wages. In order to achieve factor market equilibrium
(12), country i may then allow for nominal factor prices that violate the nominal
anchor in that c (w1i ) > 1. This implies that Ẽij < 1. With Eij tied down to 1 by
the common currency, the outcome then is what we call an “implicit overvaluation”
of country i’s currency, mij > 1.
What do bilateral trade flows look like, if there are such deviations from the
gravity norm? We first rewrite the underlying demand equation (1), using actual
exchange rates Eij instead of PPP rates, but still expressing all right-hand side
variables in the numéraire currency. First, note that in this equation we have pij =
EijTijc(wi)/ρ. Expressing this in currency 1 gives Ej1pij = Ej1EijTijc(wi)/ρ =
Ei1Tijc(wi)/ρ. Moreover, given the definition of mij and Ẽij, we have Eij = mijẼij
and therefore Ei1c(wi) = mi1c(w1). Hence, the country j price index, expressed in







1−σ]1/(1−σ) = P̃j · µ
1/(σ−1)
j . (13)








a term that we shall subsequently refer to as multilateral misalignment. In turn,
10Remember that c(·) is the unit cost-function dual to g(v), which defines the input bundle used
in production, both for variable and for fixed inputs.
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the country j c.i.f. price of a country i variety, again expressed in currency 1 and
allowing for mi1 6= 1, is written as
Ej1pij = mi1Tijc(w1)/ρ = p̃i ·mi1Tij. (15)
With currency misalignment, we must expect deviations of the macroeconomic
equilibrium that is usually assumed in the gravity model. Disequilibrium may take
the form of aggregate trade imbalance (external imbalance) or unemployment (in-
ternal imbalance), or some combination of both; see Corden (1994). In order to
allow for such imbalances, we write the importing country j’s aggregate expenditure





using ei to denote the exporting country i’s employment ratio (applying equally for
all of its factors), its actual number of firms is determined as
Ni = εig(vi)/ (fσ) = εiÑi. (16)
Notice that while ξj may be above or below 1, the employment ratio εi is restricted to
εi ≤ 1. For any given country i, given its pattern of currency misalignment, we must
expect that the two terms representing the macroeconomic imbalance, ξi and εi, are
dependent on each other. For instance, overall undervaluation of i’s currency, say
measured through trade-weighted average value of mij across all j above 1, would
tend to cause ξi < 1 and εi close to 1. Of course, macroeconomic imbalances
also depend on macroeconomic policies pursued. For instance, a country with an
overvalued currency tends to have εi < 1, but may still achieve full employment by
expansionary policy that leads to a current account deficit, i.e., ξi > 1; see again
Corden (1994). As will become apparent below, our results do not depend on the
type of macroeconomic policies pursued.
Actual demand with misalignment and expressed in destination currency j is
then Dij = ξjYj (Pj)
σ−1 (pij)
−σ. Due to homogeneity of degree zero in income and
prices, we may also write Dij = Ej1ξjYj (Ej1Pj)
σ−1 (Ej1pij)
−σ. Moreover, from (7)
we have Ỹj = Ñjqjc(w1)/ρ, while YjEj1 = εjÑjqjmj1c(w1)/ρ, hence
YjEj1 = εjmj1Ỹj. (17)
This allows us to establish the following relationship between actual demand Dij
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and gravity norm demand D̃ij:
Dij = D̃ij · (mi1)
−σ µjmj1ξjεj. (18)
This equation identifies four possible channels through which currency misalign-
ments may cause a deviation of a typical gravity-type demand function from the
gravity norm. First, there is the direct overvaluation (or undervaluation) of the
country of origin currency i through the term mi1 > 1 (or mi1 < 1), with elastic-
ity −σ. Second, there is multilateral misalignment of all currencies µj, operating
through the destination country j’s price index. Notice that from the definition of
µj in equation (14), overvaluation of third countries’ currencies boosts exports from
i to j. Third, there is the direct nominal income effect from overvaluation (under-
valuation) of the importer currency j, meaning mj1 > 1 (mj1 < 1). And finally,
there are the macroeconomic imbalances. If country j runs a current account deficit,
meaning ξj > 1, this contributes to an increase in actual demand Dij, compared
to gravity norm demand D̃ij. The opposite holds true if country j suffers from
misalignment-induced unemployment, meaning εj < 1.
Notice that we have described the entire pattern of bilateral over- or undervalu-
ation of as many as M currencies by M − 1 misalignment terms. This reflects the
well known fact that with M currencies there cannot be more than M − 1 indepen-
dent exchange rates. Moreover, it is obvious that within this model the quantity of
country j demand for country i′s varieties is independent of which of the currency
is used as a numéraire when expressing prices and incomes.
The next step is to move from demand of a certain country for a certain foreign
variety to a general equilibrium relationship relating aggregate bilateral exports
to gravity norm exports, as given in (10) as well as (9) and (11), and currency
misalignments. First, note that in the absence of real trade costs, the term µj in







which is a constant that shifts demand in all pairs in the same way. Remember,
however, that in this equation we must see Ni = εiÑi, with εi potentially below 1.
This is an important insight. The trade effect of misalignment that runs through the
multilateral dimension is the same for all bilateral trading relationships. However,
in addition to the size of country j’s trading partners i, their respective “distance”
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from country j as measured through its real trade costs Tij, determines their weight
in country j’s multilateral misalignment effect µj. A further noteworthy feature is
that domestic demand is also affected by misalignment
Dii = D̃ii · (mi1)
1−σ µiξiεi, (19)
where (mi1)
1−σ is a direct effect, and µi is an indirect effect that captures misalign-
ment with all trading partners.
Our variable of interest is the c.i.f.-value of bilateral exports, measured in country
1’s currency. By analogy to (19), we aim at an expression that relates this to gravity
norm exports as given in (10) above. As a first step, we write
Xij = DijεiÑiEj1pij. (20)
The price pij is affected by misalignment. By definition, p̃i = c(w1)/ρ, hence the
mill price pi in currency i is related to its gravity norm value according to pi =
[c (wi) /c (w1) ] p̃i. Moreover, by definition of bilateral purchasing power in equation
(3) and the misalignment term in (4), we have c (wi)/ c (w1) = Ẽ1i = E1i/m1i. This
last term may also be written as E1i/m1i = mi1/Ei1 = mi1E1i. All of this may be
summarized by the following expressions for the c.i.f. price of a typical country i




p̃i = EijE1imi1Tij p̃i = E1jmi1Tij p̃i.
Converting back to the numéraire currency, we haveEj1pij = mi1Tij p̃i, since Ej1E1j =
1. Turning to aggregate exports as given in (20) and using (18), we have
Xij = D̃ijµjξjmj1εj (mi1)
−σ
· εiÑiTijmi1p̃i.




















from (8) in the previous subsection in this
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Comparing this expression to equation (10), we finally arrive at an equation explain-
ing the deviation of exports from the gravity norm as follows:
Xij = X̃ij · (mi1)
1−σ µjmj1ξjεiεj. (22)
We call equation (22) the “misalignment-augmented” gravity equation for bilat-
eral trade between country j and i, whereby the “gravity norm” value of exports X̃ij
is given in (10). In the empirical strategy implemented below, we shall make use of
two alternative further formulations of this model. The first is obtained by dividing
through YiEi1YjEj1ξj, making use of (17), thus getting rid of all variables that reflect
policy preferences with respect to internal and external balance. Dropping the term











Notice that we divide by the exporting country’s GDP, but by the importing coun-
try’s expenditure. This is in line with the fundamental idea of gravity: With an
aggregate trade imbalance, the “economic mass” of a certain country in its role as
an importer is adequately captured by its expenditure level, while for its role as an
exporter it is captured by its GDP. We now call the left-hand side of (23) the grav-
itational ratio of exports.11 Note also that equation (23) invokes our assumption,
made above, that real trade costs are symmetric, Tij = Tji, whence P̃j = Π̃j. But
this is not crucial for our main conclusions.
A remarkable aspect of equation (23) is that it involves no bilateral misalignment
term. Multiple misalignments between all currencies are captured by variables that
are either specific to the exporter country or the importer country, but not specific to
the country-pair. We therefore refer to this equation as the unilateral misalignment-
version of our gravity model. It allows us to state the following proposition on
currency misalignments and trade in a gravity context.
11We introduce this term in order to emphasize a departure from existing literature. Empirical
applications of the gravity equation invariably define the dependent variable as trade, relative to
the product of both countries’ GDPs, although a typical sample includes many countries with
unbalanced trade.
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Proposition 1 (decomposing bilateral misalignment) (i) The effect of bilat-
eral misalignments of real exchange rates on the gravitational ratio of exports may
be decomposed into a pure exporter-country and a pure importer-country effect: the
exporting country’s unilateral misalignment vis à vis the numéraire currency, and
the importing-country’s misalignment-ridden multilateral resistance term, relative
to its gravity norm multilateral resistance. (ii) Irrespective of whether there are real
exchange rate misalignments or not, all parameters that drive the microeconomic
channel of real trade costs Tij, including the transaction cost effect of a common
currency, may be consistently estimated by regressing the gravitational ratio of ex-
ports on the relevant trade barrier controls, provided that the estimation includes
time-varying country-fixed effects that distinguish between a country’s role as an
exporter and importer, respectively.
Proof. Part (i) follows from equation (23) where the exporter-country mis-
alignment effect is (mi1)









measures multilateral misalignment in
a way which is completely analogous to the CES price index of importing country






, where Ej1Pj and P̃j are the importing country’s misalignment-
ridden and the gravity norm multilateral resistance terms, respectively, both ex-
pressed in numéraire currency 1. Part (ii) of the proposition is a direct conse-
quence of the fact that equation (23) decomposes bilateral misalignment into a pure
exporter- and a pure importer-country effect.12
Equation (23) involves unobservable gravity norm variables, viz. the multilat-
eral resistance terms Π̃i and Π̃j and multilateral misalignment µ̂j. In our empirical
strategy detailed in the next section, we make use of proposition 1 (ii) to obtain con-
sistent estimates of Tij, which we then use in order to compute these unobservables.
This allows us to estimate the full unilateral version of our model as given in (23).
However, such an estimation does not yet allow us to answer our key questions: Did
the introduction of the Euro cause such misalignment-induced trade effects? Are
they more prevalent if country pairs use the common currency than for pairs of
countries with separate currencies?
In order to address these questions, we must bring bilateral cost-divergencies
into the picture. This may be done by multiplying equation (22) by (mj1/mj1)
σ.
12It should be noted that asymmetric fixed effects, as postulated by proposition 1, are dictated
even if real trade costs are symmetric, as often assumed in the literature.
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For easier reference, we denote cost divergence by
m̄ij := c(wi)/c(wj). (24)
After some manipulation of terms, we obtain the following representation of the











We call this the bilateral misalignment-version of our gravity model, since it high-
lights the role of bilateral exchange rate misalignment m̄ijEij. Unsurprisingly, the
cost divergence term m̄ij and the nominal exchange rate enter symmetrically. Poten-
tially, then, upward or downward trends in m̄ij may be compensated by offsetting
trends in Eij, with trade left unchanged according to its gravity norm. Our key
question now is whether fixing Eij = 1 tends to cause uncompensated cost divergen-
cies between member countries. If this is the case, then we may say that currency
union causes trade to deviate from the gravity norm.13
The nominal factor prices wi and wj appearing in (24) are determined, jointly
with the nominal exchange rate Eij, though a complex interaction between the
currency arrangement and the monetary policy regimes in countries i and j, and
their institutions pertaining to nominal factor price determination, particularly wage
formation. This same interaction also determines how nominal factor prices in these
countries and their exchange rates respond to endowment shocks dvi and dvj.
14 We
represent this interaction through the following equation:
Eij = (m̄ij)
αij ηiηj. (26)
This equation stipulates that the nominal exchange rate between i and j is deter-
mined by two country-specific effects and a country-pair-specific effect that repre-
sents the influence of bilateral cost divergence. The two terms ηi and ηj capture the
influence of the respective country’s general macroeconomic policy stance as regards
13In an empirical estimation of equation (25), if we were to allow for independent coefficients on
m̄ij and Eij , then the estimates for these coefficients should be the same. Then, what is trivial in
theory, viz. that cost divergence may be absorbed by nominal exchange rate adjustments, is borne
out by the data. However, this does not mean that such adjustments will always take place when
needed in order to compensate for trends in m̄ij .
14This connects to our earlier discussion where we have connected misalignment to endowment
shocks. Our argument similarly applies, mutatis mutandis, to technology or productivity shocks.
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the nominal exchange rate. Of course, equation (26) does not follow directly from
any structural model of exchange rate determination. But it is a simple, yet flexible
tool to incorporate nominal exchange rate formation in view of deviations from the
gravity norm. As to the pair-specific effect captured by (m̄ij)
αij , this equation is not
intended as a causality statement. Causality can go both ways. For instance, with
respect to the EU, it is probably fair to say that in pre-euro-times m̄ij has driven
Eij, and there was a hope that in euro-times we would have Eij = 1 driving m̄ij, in
line with what we call the gravity norm.
We have emphasized above that with C currencies there can be no more than
C − 1 independent nominal exchange rates. Hence, the parameter αij cannot vary
freely across all pairs. Nor can we hope to estimate pair-specific parameters αij





for non-euro zone country pairs
for euro zone country pairs.
(27)
The parameter α0 captures the influence of bilateral cost-divergencies on bilateral
nominal exchange rates for countries that have their own currencies, given the two
countries macroeconomic policy regimes captured by ηi and ηj. The parameter
α1 takes care of the fact that Eij is restricted to a value of 1, if countries i and
j share the same currency. If α0 = −1 and α1 = 0, then we have neutrality of
money: Whether countries have a common currency or not, cost divergencies do not
affect trade. For countries with separate currencies, cost divergencies are perfectly
offset by nominal exchange rate adjustments. And members of a currency union are
able to avoid cost divergencies. Formally, this case implies dm̄ij/m̄ij = −dEij/Eij,
whence m̄ijEij is a constant. If α0 > −1, then changes in cost-competitiveness are
less than fully compensated for by nominal exchange rate changes. And if α1 > 0,
then the common currency restriction makes a difference in that lack of exchange
rate adjustment causes, or exacerbates, misalignment of the bilateral real exchange
rate. This allows us to state the following proposition on the misalignment effect of
a common currency in the gravity context.
Proposition 2 (misalignment effect of a common currency) (i) Suppose nom-
inal exchange rate determination satisfies (26) and (27). Then, in the bilateral ver-
sion of the misalignment-augmented gravity model given in (25), we may replace
(m̄ijEij)
−σ = (m̄ij)
β0+β1eij ηiηj, were eij = 1 indicates member countries of the cur-
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rency union. The coefficient β0 = −σ(1+α0) measures the extent to which bilateral
cost divergencies affect bilateral trade for countries with different currencies, while
the coefficient β1 = −σα1 measures the differential effect caused by cost divergencies
between countries who are members of a currency union. (ii) If these coefficients
satisfy the condition β0 + β1 < β0 < 0, then bilateral cost divergencies cause real
exchange rate misalignment even for countries with separate currencies, but this mis-
alignment effect is in any case stronger for countries who share the same currency.
Proof. In view of (25), we may write (m̄ijEij)
−σ = m̄
−σ(1+αij)
ij ηiηj, and in line




with β0 = −σ(1 + α0) and β1 = −σα1.
For part (ii), we simply need to recognize that β0 < 0 implies α0 > −1, and that
β1 < 0 implies α1 > 0, as σ > 1 by assumption. Moreover, β0 + β1 < 0 implies
α0 + a1 > −1. Given our discussion preceding the proposition, this proofs part (ii).
In closing this section, we note one important point. In replacing as suggested in
part (i) of proposition 2 we get rid of the nominal exchange rate Eij in the gravity
equation. This is intentional, since we do not want to control for the influence of
nominal exchange rates on trade flows. Instead, our focus lies on cost divergencies
m̄ij, and in estimating this version of the gravity equation we want to let the data tell
us to what extent cost divergencies dm̄ij are absorbed by exchange rate adjustments.
4 Empirical implementation and results
4.1 Data and estimation method
Our estimation relies on a panel of 20 OECD countries for the years from 1995
through 2007 - a common setup in this type of literature.15 The data stem from
15The countries included are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
United Kingdom, and United States. The time span was chosen with data quality considerations
in mind. In particular, Baldwin (2006) discusses weaknesses of pre-1993 trade data for European
countries. We drop data for the years 1993 and 1994 to avoid having to control for the effect of
EU accession of some countries - a choice that does not affect our results except for adding clarity
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standard sources: trade data are taken from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics
(DoTS), and gravity controls including GDPs stem from CEPII. As a proxy for
nominal cost conditions in domestic currency, c(wi), we use the total-economy unit
labor cost from the OECD that we have already described in section 2. Using total
economy values seems reasonable, given the multiple linkages between sectors in the
production of traded goods. That is, we allow for the cost of non-traded interme-
diates to affect the competitiveness of traded goods sectors. However, running our
regressions using manufacturing unit labor cost, we find that all major results are
robust to this variation of the data input. For all calculations and simulations we
choose the US dollar as the numéraire currency, but the results of course do not
hinge on this choice.
There are two general issues relating to the appropriate method of estimation
that we should like to discuss at the outset. The first relates to the fundamental
point, made by Baier and Bergstrand (2007), that trade policy is not exogenous
to trade. In our case as well, one might argue that the likelihood of two countries
having a common currency is endogenous to bilateral trade levels. Indeed, bilateral
openness to trade is one of the macroeconomic criteria of the theory of optimum
currency areas (OCA); see McKinnon (1963). To the extent that this criterion does
indeed determine the emergence of currency unions, the common currency variable
(dummy) will itself be in structural dependence on trade. Following the reasoning of
Baier and Bergstrand (2007), ignoring this endogeneity would result in an upward-
bias in the coefficient indicating the trade effect of a common currency. However,
as forcefully argued by Wyplosz (2006), the formation of the European Monetary
Union (EMU) was certainly not guided by the theory of optimum currency areas,
hence structural endogeneity can safely be ruled out. But it might still be argued
that the countries eligible for EMU at the time had bilateral trade flows exceeding
their “natural” gravity levels, for various reasons unrelated to the theory of OCA. We
would then have the same upward-bias in the estimate, due to an omitted variable
that is correlated with the currency union variable. To guard against this possibility,
we will follow Baier and Bergstrand (2007) in estimating our gravity model on first
differences of our panel data.
The second issue relates to the usual procedure of estimating the above gravity
equations by means of log-linearization and then applying OLS. Silva and Tenreyro
in the exposition.
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(2006) have pointed out that OLS in general leads to biased estimates.16 They argue
for a weighted non-linear least squares estimator, where the weights happen to coin-
cide with those of the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) regression. An
important drawback of PPML is that pair-specific unobserved heterogeneity cannot
be controlled for, which is potentially important in explaining selection into euro
membership; see the discussion on estimating in first differences to eliminate the
endogeneity problem above. Regarding stage two, our main coefficient of interest
will be the interaction term β1eij. In non-linear models, the sign, size and signifi-
cance level of coefficients on interaction terms are difficult to interpret; see ?. We
therefore rely on linear estimation models in both stages, controlling for pair-specific
unobserved heterogeneity by means of a first difference transformation.17
4.2 Microeconomic effects
We first identify the parameters that drive the microeconomic channel. Subse-
quently, we shall use these parameters to construct the unobservables required to
estimate the misalignment channel. Following proposition 1, equation (23) allows us
to consistently estimate the trade cost elasticity of the euro, alongside other deter-





= αeijt + ̺RTAijt + νij + νit + νjt + uijt, (29)
where RTAijt measures common membership in a regional trade agreement,
18 νij,
νit and νjt denote comprehensive sets of pair fixed effects, exporter-and-time effects
and importer-and-time effects, and uijt denotes an error term which is assumed iid.
16More specifically, Silva and Tenreyro (2006) argue that the variance of the error term is likely
to be correlated with country size and trade cost. Since the expected value of the logarithm of
a random variable also depends on higher moments of the density, this leads to a violation of
stochastic independence between the regressors and the error term in the log-linear regression
equation. As a result, the OLS estimator is no longer consistent. A further reason for PPML is
the presence of zero trade flows. In our sample, however, there are no zero trade flows.
17Recent gravity applications using linear regression models include Martin et al. (2008) and
Head et al. (2010). In our linear model, the euro-dummy coefficient is small and does not enter
significantly; see below. This finding is in line with Silva and Tenreyro (2010) who employ PPML
on data similar to ours and conclude that there is no positive microeconomic effect. We have also
experimented with PPML. Results are similar to those reported in column OECD93 in their Table
1 and are available upon request.
18First-differencing of our data removes all regional trade agreements with no time variation in
membership between 1995 and 2007, such as the European Union (EU) and the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Given out country sample, the only remaining RTA is the
Australia-US free trade agreement.
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The estimated semi-elasticity α̂1 measures by how much bilateral trade increases
through the real trade cost channel when both trading partners join the euro zone,
compared to non-euro country pairs.19 All other terms on the right-hand side of
(23) are captured by fixed effects.
We estimate equation (29) using two alternative approaches. The first is a fixed
effects (FE) estimator, where the pair fixed effect is νij eliminated by means of a
within-transformation. The second is to use a first difference (FD) estimator, which
eliminates all pair-specific effects. Table 2 reports the estimation results for α and ̺.
Both approaches reveal euro-dummy coefficients that are very small in magnitude
and do not enter the regression with conventional significance levels. This is in
line with the related literature, which typically reports zero or tiny coefficients, not
exceeding 2 percent.20
Table 2: The microeconomic channel
FE FD
Both in euro zone (α) 0.00559 -0.0147
(0.29) (-0.40)




Notes: FE and FD mean fixed effects and first differences, respec-
tively. The sample includes 19× 20 = 380 country pairs over the pe-
riod 1995 to 2007. The dependent variable is bilateral exports scaled
by exporter’s GDP and importer’s expenditure. Cluster-robust t-
statistics are in parentheses. Both regressions include comprehensive
sets of exporter-and-time effects and importer-and-time effects (all
not shown). Based on an F-test, we cannot reject joint significance
of the pair fixed effects in column (1).
In appendix A, we include the pair fixed effects directly and trace the estimates
ν̂ij back to the dyadic trade barrier variables. This allows us to identify the elastic-
ities of real trade cost Tij with respect to these barriers. However, given equation
19Specifically, the estimated percentage increase of trade due to the euro is equal to (exp(α̂1) −
1) × 100.
20The literature usually employs a pair fixed-effects model in combination with “role-specific”
(or asymmetric) country-and-time dummies. Role-specific means that the dummies distinguish
between a country’s role as an exporter and an importer. For a summary of the effects reported
in the literature, see Baldwin et al. (2008).
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(23), doing so requires that we impose a numerical value for the trade elasticity σ−1.
We set σ = 5 and σ = 10, which are the lower and upper bound, respectively, of the
range suggested in Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003). Using all of this information,
we finally construct a full matrix of estimated bilateral trade costs T̂ij, which are
numerical representations of all time-invariant trade barriers for each country pair
in the sample. Knowing T̂ij, we may exploit equilibrium conditions underlying (23)
in order to calculate numerical values of the gravity norm multilateral resistance
terms Π̃i and Π̃j as well as the multilateral misalignment term µjt. Details of these
calculations are relegated to appendix A.
4.3 Misalignment channel
Based on numerical values of gravity norm variables, we are now in a position
to estimate the misalignment channel which is responsible for deviations of trade
volumes from the gravity norm, as suggested by our augmented gravity model (23).
In particular, we are able to ask the question raised in the introduction: Does
bilateral divergence in relative cost competitiveness exert an effect on trade among
euro area countries that does not exist for countries outside a fixed exchange rate
arrangement? Put differently, is euro area trade particularly affected by the fact
that euro member countries cannot adjust their internal exchange rates in order
to compensate for shock absorptions that are inconsistent with a common nominal
anchor?
Invoking proposition 2 above, we answer this question by testing whether the ef-
fect of bilateral cost divergence, i.e. c(wi)/c(wj) 6= 1, on bilateral exports is different
for within euro area trade flows, compared to trade involving countries outside the
currency union. Note that equation (26) allows for such misalignment to be present
also in non-euro-area trade flows. Our maintained hypothesis draws on proposition
2, and it simply states that, whatever the misalignment-induced trade effect from
cost divergence between trading partners outside the euro zone, this effect is larger
for trade between euro member countries which are bound together by a common
nominal anchor. It must also be noted that our point is not to demonstrate the
trade effect of real exchange rate variations as such. Instead, our contribution is
to quantify the extent to which the euro has caused misalignment-induced trade
effects.






= α∆eijt + ̺∆RTAijt + β0∆ ln m̄ijt





+ νt + uijt. (30)
This equation is based on proposition 2 above. The term ∆m̄ijt ≡ ∆ ln [c(wi)/c(wj)]
denotes the log-change in bilateral cost divergence as defined in (24). Note that
first-differencing eliminates all observed time-invariant dyadic effects νij, such as
geographical distance, a common border etc. It also eliminates all unobserved effects,
like cultural proximity, as well as time-invariant monadic effects. We have added a
comprehensive set of time effects νt.
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The first set of estimation results is found in table 3, with a row-wise presentation
of estimated coefficients, and with columns separating different specifications and
country samples. All specifications include time fixed effects νt, but these are not
reported. Column (1) is based on a specification that imposes β1 = 0 and uses
information from the simulation exercise for σ = 5, estimated on all country pairs
in the sample.
Before turning to our main results, consider the effect of trade costs. Results
are reported in the last two rows. The euro as a common currency does not appear
to have a significantly positive effect on bilateral trade through the microeconomic
channel. Indeed, the estimated coefficient α̂ in the first row implies a microeconomic
effect of about 2%, but it does not bear any statistical significance. This corroborates
the result obtained above, and we repeat that it is in line with existing literature.
The insignificant RTA-coefficient from table 2 is corroborated as well.
Our estimation yields a negative coefficient estimate for the importer-country’s
misalignment with respect to the numéraire currency, ∆ lnmj1t, which is perfectly
in line with our theoretical model; see equation (25). The importer’s multilateral
misalignment, ∆ lnµjt, does not enter significantly in column (1), although the sign
is as expected. The reason for the large standard error is that multilateral mis-
alignment has a strong linear relationship to other regressors; see table 10 in the
appendix. In the light of equation (25), we expect δ̂ to be equal to σ − 1. Indeed,
21In view of (26) which represents our underlying view of nominal exchange rate behavior, first
differencing also controls for the macroeconomic policy variables ηi and ηj , if these are time-
invariant. Recall that in line with proposition 2 above we drop Eijt, in order to let the data tell
us about the behavior of nominal exchange rates, relative to cost divergencies.
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δ̂ turns out to be in the expected range, we gives us confidence in our estimation
approach. β̂0 < 0 indicates that bilateral cost divergence induces a divergence from
the gravity norm for the average country pair.
Table 3: Misalignment channel: Baseline specification
σ = 5 σ = 10
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bilateral cost -0.308∗∗ -0.258∗ -0.309∗∗ -0.259∗
divergence (β0) (-2.46) (-1.89) (-2.45) (-1.88)
Euro-induced -0.384∗ -0.381∗
misalign. (β1) (-1.90) (-1.88)
Importer -0.634∗∗∗ -0.640∗∗∗ -0.614∗∗∗ -0.617∗∗∗
misalign. (γ1) (-5.24) (-5.30) (-5.54) (-5.59)
Multilateral 0.048 0.0504 0.0204∗ 0.0211∗
misalign. (γ2) (1.50) (1.57 ) (1.66) (1.72)
Price index (δ) 4.108∗∗∗ 4.111∗∗∗ 9.561∗∗∗ 9.578∗∗∗
(2.87) (2.88) (2.99) (3.00)
Both in euro 0.0225 0.0225 0.0227 0.0227
zone (α) (0.99) (0.98) (1.00) (0.99)
Both in RTA (̺) -0.0472 -0.0472 -0.0461 -0.0461
(-1.05) (-1.04) (-0.99) (-0.98)
Notes: Estimation method: First Differences. The sample includes 19×20 =
380 country pairs over the period 1995 to 2007. The dependent variable is
bilateral exports scaled by exporter’s GDP and importer’s expenditure. t-
statistics are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at 1%, 5%,
and 10%, respectively. All regressions include time effects (all not shown).
Our main hypothesis regarding the misalignment channel receives a first treat-
ment in column (2) in 3, where β1 is unrestricted. Rows one and two turn to
proposition 2 above, reporting coefficient estimates β̂0 and β̂1, respectively. The
interpretation of these coefficients is that an x percent loss in bilateral cost compet-
itiveness of country i vis à vis country j lowers country i’s exports to country j by
(β0 + β1) × x percent if i and j are both members of the euro zone, and by β0 × x
percent otherwise. The estimates in column (2) support our hypothesis that for
trade between member countries a loss in bilateral cost competitiveness feeds into a
stronger negative trade effect than for non-members. Note that from the first row we
clearly cannot reject the hypothesis that β0 < 0. Thus, for trade with or between
non-member countries cost divergence is not fully absorbed by nominal exchange
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rate adjustments either. However, our key point relates to the result that β1 < 0
at the 10 percent significance level. Invoking proposition 2, we may thus conclude
from column (2) of table 3 that the euro, while not making much of a difference
in the microeconomic channel, has exerted a significant misalignment-induced trade
effect. Importantly, identifying an insignificant microeconomic channel does not tell
us the whole story.
To explore robustness, we also test our main hypothesis on a sample where
price indices and multilateral misalignment come from a simulation that imposes
σ = 10. The results are reported in columns (3) and (4). Interestingly, δ̂, the
estimated coefficient on the simulated price index, is again close to σ − 1, while all
other coefficients are remarkably stable. Hence, our estimation results do not seem
to hinge on the exact choice of the trade elasticity 1 − σ in stage one. A further
noteworthy aspect is that setting σ = 10 renders coefficients γ̂2 on the multilateral
misalignment term that are significant significant at the 10% level and have the
expected sign.
Against the backdrop of limited variation in the simulated misalignment term
lnµjt, we reformulate our model so that this term disappears altogether. Following
Martin et al. (2008), we look at exports of country i to any destination country
j, relative to exports of some other country k to that same country of destination.
As a result, all importer-specific effects cancel out and we get rid of country j’s
unilateral and multilateral misalignment terms as well as its price index and its
cost misalignment term in equation (30). Importantly, we choose the “denominator
country” k among the initial members of the euro zone. Writing xij for the left-hand
















Simplifying and using (26) and (28), which represent our underlying hypotheses
regarding nominal exchange rate formation, the last term on the right-hand side of







In principle, the interpretation of the coefficients β0 and β1 is as in proposition
2 above, but now the misalignment is between two competing countries of export
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supply. Differing cost divergencies between the two exporting countries and the
importing country j cannot both be absorbed at the same time by exchange rate
adjustments, if i and k are both members of the euro area. Suppose these two
countries start out from a gravity norm equilibrium in their trade with country j.
Our main hypothesis then states that ∆ ln m̄ik = ∆ ln c(wi) − ∆ ln c(wk) > 0 leads
to a situation where the gravity norm is necessarily violated. As regards exchange
rate adjustment vis à vis currency j, the common currency will seem an overvalued
or undervalued currency, depending on whether it is judged from country i’s cost
perspective or country k’s cost perspective, relative to country j. Of course, the
situation may also be a combination of both. Indeed, it might even seem an overval-
ued (undervalued) currency judged from either of the two exporting countries, but
the overvaluation (undervaluation) will then be more (less) pronounced for country
i than for country k. Thus, the hypothesis represented by equation (32) above is
independent of the type of misalignment, if any, between the destination country j
and any one of the two exporting countries i and k.







+ α(eijt − ekjt) + ̺ (rtaijt − rtakjt)
+β0∆ ln m̄ikt + β1∆ ln m̄ikt × eikt + νt + uijt (33)
Note that all importer-country-specific effects cancel out, and any k-specific fixed
effect (including ηkt) is absorbed by the year dummies, since we use a single denom-
inator country for all relative export ratios xijt/xkjt. Again, we include a set of time
dummies νt in the estimation. As above, α captures the microeconomic trade effects,
while the β0 and β1 capture the macroeconomic channel. A positive trade effect of
the euro through the microeconomic channel implies α > 0.22 A misalignment-
induced trade effect of the common currency through the macroeconomic channel
implies β1 < 0, in line with proposition 2 above.
We estimate the ratio equation (33) on first differences of our data, by complete
analogy to (30) above. We provide the results for each initial euro zone country
from our sample as a denominator country k.23 Table 4 presents the estimation
22If i and k are both members of the euro area, then eij − ekj = 0, reflecting the fact that they
face the same transaction costs in trade with country j, no matter whether j is a member or not.
Notice that by construction of our approach, k is a euro country. Thus, if j is a member, then
eij − ejk = 0 if i is a member, and eij − ejk = −1 if i is outside the euro zone. Hence, a positive
trade effect of the euro through the microeconomic channel implies α3 > 0.
23Obviously, with 11 initial member countries of the euro zone, the number of possible denomi-
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results from this “ratio methodology”. In the first line, we find scattered evidence in
favor of a significant transaction cost effect on trade. However, with only 3 out of
10 estimates being positive and significant, we see little reason to revise our earlier
conclusion of an insignificant microeconomic channel.
As in all previous estimations, bilateral cost divergence and the interaction term
appear with negative coefficients which are statistically significant. Thus, the earlier
result of a significant misalignment channel for trade effects of the euro is corrobo-
rated by this approach. Comparing the results in more detail, we find the coefficients
to be almost twice the size of the values in table 3, a phenomenon known from the
literature on this approach; see Martin et al. (2008). Comparing across columns,
we find that choosing different reference countries does not change the estimates
a lot. There is one exception: Choosing Ireland annihilates the significance of the
misalignment channel.
4.4 Country-specific euro effects
Given the diverse picture of vastly different unit labor cost developments across
member countries of the euro that we have presented in section 2 above, what do
our estimation results imply for individual members’ euro-related trade experience?
In this section we want to answer this question by applying sample values for bilateral
cost-divergence to our estimated coefficients β̂0 and β̂1. We report cumulative effects
over the period 1999 - 2007, aggregating over all euro trading partners. Given the
insignificant coefficient estimates for the conventional trade cost channel of the euro
effect, we treat this channel as non-existent. More specifically, for each original































nator countries is 10.
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Table 4: Misalignment channel: Ratio approach
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
AUT BEL FIN FRA DEU IRE ITA NLD PRT ESP
Bilateral cost -0.620∗∗∗ -0.547∗∗∗ -0.717∗∗∗ -0.546∗∗∗ -0.699∗∗∗ -0.742∗∗∗ -0.633∗∗∗ -0.487∗∗∗ -0.551∗∗∗ -0.532∗∗∗
divergence (β0) (-3.60) (-3.40) (-4.32) (-3.59) (-5.03) (-3.45) (-4.13) (-3.30) (-3.43) (-3.18)
Euro-induced -0.671∗∗∗ -0.936∗∗∗ -0.545∗∗ -0.881∗∗∗ -0.528∗∗∗ -0.152 -0.651∗∗∗ -1.126∗∗∗ -0.991∗∗∗ -0.751∗∗∗
misalignment (β1) (-2.95) (-3.78) (-2.11) (-3.54) (-3.87) (-0.62) (-2.66) (-5.17) (-3.18) (-2.93)
Exporter 7.401∗∗∗ 6.097∗∗∗ 7.883∗∗∗ 6.996∗∗∗ 7.633∗∗∗ 6.240∗∗∗ 6.630∗∗∗ 6.141∗∗∗ 5.480∗∗ 5.766∗∗∗
price index (δ) (3.47) (3.28) (4.15) (3.73) (4.43) (2.81) (3.66) (3.51) (2.53) (3.16)
Both in 0.0866∗ -0.0225 0.00958 -0.0216 0.0413∗ 0.0680∗∗ 0.0233 0.0382 -0.000317 0.00729
euro zone (α) (1.96) (-0.90) (0.40) (-0.79) (1.67) (2.27) (0.88) (1.44) (-0.01) (0.29)
Both in -0.128∗∗∗ -0.00872 -0.0195 -0.0906 -0.0353 0.0512 -0.00448 -0.0343 0.105 -0.00462
RTA (̺) (-5.74) (-0.21) (-1.53) (-1.14) (-0.85) -1.1 (-0.06) (-0.54) -0.89 (-0.05)
N 4332 4332 4332 4332 4332 4332 4332 4332 4332 4332
R2 0.0644 0.0583 0.0426 0.0442 0.0304 0.0564 0.0363 0.15 0.056 0.0362
Notes: Estimation method: First differences. The sample includes 19 × 19 = 361 country pairs over the period 1995 to 2007. The dependent variable
is relative bilateral exports scaled by exporter’s GDP and importer’s expenditure. The reference country is listed at the top of each column. Cluster-
robust t-statistics are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. All regressions include time effects (not
shown).
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The first line looks at the intra-euro export side of country i, while the second
looks at its intra-euro imports. In both lines, summation is over all fellow member
countries. We thus compute the misalignment-induced percentage changes in the
gravitational export and import ratios, respectively, over the entire time span since
introduction of the euro covered by our sample.24 Completely analogous calculations
may be carried out for trade with non-euro trading partners by using the parameter
estimate β̂0 instead of β̂0 + β̂1 and summing up over non-euro trading partners. In
a situation with β̂0 6= 0, which is conveyed by the ratio approach, this would refer
to imperfectly absorbed cost-divergencies even outside of a currency union.
Note that the gravitational ratios of exports and imports are asymmetric. Al-
though ∆ ln m̄ij ≡ −∆ ln m̄ji, the two calculations above do not lead to symmetric
results, since whenever countries have unbalanced trade, we have ψij 6= ζji.
25 Im-
portantly, the numbers reported do not take into account that trade is differently
important, measured as a percent of GDP, for different countries. Indeed, normal-
izing bilateral trade flows by the joint size (or “mass”) of the trading partners is
the main idea behind applying gravity. Obviously, the percentage changes of the
conventional ratios of exports or imports to GDP are larger than the changes in
the gravitational ratios by an amount equal to the percentage change in the trading
partners GDPs or expenditures.
Table 5 presents calculated misalignment-induced effects for within euro area
trade for each of the original euro member countries (plus Greece), both for its
imports and its exports. Notice that this table looks only at the misalignment chan-
nel, reflecting the fact that we have not obtained a significant euro-coefficient in the
transaction cost channel.26 We report results only for the estimated coefficients β̂0
and β̂1 as given in column (2) of 3, which assumes a value of σ = 5 for the underly-
ing simulation of the gravity norm variables. The relevant parameter estimates are
almost the same for σ = 10, hence the country-specific trade effects will hardly vary
across these sets of estimates. The effects using the estimates reported for the ratio
approach are correspondingly larger, but are not presented in Table 5.
24It should be noted that this is but a rough approximation, since we apply log-linearization for
a discrete, large change. We use “current period” weights calculated for 2007.
25Country i’s value of exports to country j is normalized by the product of its GDP and the
importing country’s expenditure. Vice versa for the value of its imports from country j; see the
definition of the gravitational export ration on the left-hand side of (23).
26This does not affect our results with respect to the country-specificity of the trade effects,
however, given the additive nature of the two trade effect channels in the interaction setting. For
example, if the euro effect is measured as the pure trade cost effect and estimated at around 2
percent as in Baldwin (2010), the numbers in table 5 would simply increase by 2 each.
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Notes: Time Period: 1999–2007. The columns show
the percentage changes in the gravitational export
and import ratios, respectively, implied by sample
values of bilateral cost-divergencies if applied to our




. We use coeffi-




= −0.258 − 0.384 =
−0.642. Values for Greece take account of the fact
that it joined the euro area in 2001.
Of course, since currency misalignment is a zero sum “experiment”, we expect a
pattern of positive and negative effects across countries. Indeed, the picture is one
of strong asymmetry. For Germany the euro has lead to a strong positive effect on
exports well above 10 percent. This is mirrored by a negative import effect of about
the same magnitude. Next come Austria and Finland, with a misalignment-induced
boost in the gravitational export ratio equal to somewhat above 4 and somewhat
below 3 percent, respectively. The only other country with a positive effect on
exports is Belgium, but the effect is hardly above zero for exports, although for
imports the effect is much stronger, above 3 percent.
All other countries see their overall intra-euro exports reduced by this channel.
This holds in particular for Ireland and Greece, with exports down by more than 9
and almost 8 percent, respectively. It is tempting to argue that this partly reflects
the large role that Germany plays as a trading partner for most other euro countries,
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but note, again, that we are looking at the gravitational ratio of exports, where the
trade flows in both directions are expressed relative to the economic mass of both
countries. Indeed, the role of Germany in this ratio is reduced by the fact that it
has run large trade surpluses while many other countries have run trade deficits.
Hence, the mere size or importance of countries cannot explain the results, even in
part. The story is really one of enormous real undervaluation of the “German euro
”that has accumulated over the time span considered.
What are we to conclude from table 5? In the policy debate it is sometimes
argued, usually without much reasoning, that Germany has gained the most from
the euro because of its high export orientation. Presumably, policy makers who
argue this way would welcome table 5 as empirical evidence that substantiates their
point. However, such an interpretation is grossly misleading. It is a mercantilistic
interpretation. One way to read this table is that the euro has ushered in i) an
increase (reduction) in German manufacturing exports (imports) and ii) a reorien-
tation of German manufacturing exports towards euro partner countries as well as
a reorientation of its imports towards non-euro countries. The opposite conclusion
holds for most of the other countries.
A further very important point is that the trade effects reported in table 5 must
not be seen as indicating benefits on an equal footing with benefits generated by ad-
ditional trade, if any, that comes about through the microeconomic channel. Lower
transaction costs represent savings in real resource cost that are immediately welfare
enhancing. In a world characterized by monopolistic competition, these welfare ef-
fects accrue to consumers in the importing countries.27 In contrast, the trade effects
through the misalignment channel are not driven by any savings in real resource use.
Additional German exports are hard-won by lower factor rewards, unless lower unit
cost reflect an increase in total factor productivity (improvements in technology).
Indeed, one might even argue that the appropriate welfare interpretation of table
5 is one of terms of trade improvements for countries exhibiting a positive import-
and a negative export effect, and vice versa for the other countries.
27It is worth mentioning that the conventional welfare gains from lower transaction costs arise on
infra-marginal trade, i.e., even if there is no additional trade, as suggested by our results. However,
the additional gains from trade usually emphasized by new trade theory do require additional trade
at the margin: variety effects, scale effects, pro-competitive effects and productivity (selection)
effect; see Baldwin (2010).
36
4.5 Robustness checks
We use this subsection to dispel some further issues and to substantiate the ro-
bustness of our main results from the previous section. A first concern regards the
specific group of euro area countries and potential selection bias. It is often argued
that the euro area countries are no random selection and that estimates aiming to
uncover any difference towards a comparison group simply pick up structural dif-
ferences. To test for selection bias, we simply ask whether the euro area members
already had a different responsiveness to cost divergence in the years leading up to
the currency union. We split the sample into pre-euro and euro-years, and we repeat
our estimation of equation (30) on both sub-periods, but for the pre-euro we interact
the misalignment variable with an indicator variable for future euro membership.
Obtaining similar coefficient estimates for the interaction term for both sub-periods
would clearly indicate presence of a selection bias. Reassuringly, however, we find
that the opposite is true. The estimates of β0 and β1 in table 6 reveal that for both,
σ = 5 and σ = 10, in pre-euro times future euro-membership does not exert any sig-
nificant interaction effect with bilateral cost-divergence, whereas actual membership
in the euro-era quite clearly does. Notice that the estimated induced misalignment
for euro countries in the post 1999 regressions is very close to β̂0 + β̂1 reported in
table 3.
In a further robustness check, we add symmetric country-and-time effects to the
model, symmetric meaning that the dummy variable makes no distinction between
a country as an exporter and an importer. These dummy variables control for
all symmetric country-specific influences that vary over time, including the gravity
norm price indices.28 In large part, table 7 replicates table 3, an important difference
being that the coefficient estimate on cost divergence for all countries, β̂0, is no
longer significantly different from zero. Importantly, however, our main hypothesis
continues to receive support from the results obtained.
Finally, we use unit labor costs for the manufacturing sector rather than economy-
wide unit labor costs. One could argue that only cost divergence originating directly
from the tradable sector is important. We have, however, argued above that input
linkages beyond manufacturing are generally important for the tradable good sec-
tor’s competitiveness. Nevertheless, we re-run our regressions with such unit labor
costs obtained solely from manufacturing. The coefficient on the price index is some-
what below its expected value, while the coefficient on bilateral cost divergence is
28Remember that we have assumed Tij = Tji, whence P̃j = Π̃j .
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Table 6: Misalignment channel: pre- and post-euro era
σ = 5 σ = 10
(1) (2) (3) (4)
pre 1999 post 1999 pre 1999 post 1999
Bilateral cost -0.395 -0.172 -0.39 -0.172
divergence (β0) (-1.58) (-1.27) (-1.56) (-1.27)
Euro-induced -0.166 -0.572∗∗∗ -0.167 -0.556∗∗
misalign. (β1) (-0.48) (-2.62) (-0.48) (-2.56)
Importer -0.574∗∗∗ -0.842∗∗∗ -0.540∗∗∗ -0.781∗∗∗
misalign. (γ1) (-3.51) (-5.99) (-3.59) (-6.78)
Multilateral 0.0761 0.0827∗ 0.0314 0.0301∗
misalign. (γ2) (1.37) (1.95) (1.42) (1.84)
Price index (δ) 6.006∗∗ 3.981∗∗∗ 13.58∗∗ 9.572∗∗∗
(1.99) (2.8) (1.98) (3.07)
N 1444 2888 1444 2888
R2 0.101 0.0176 0.100 0.0180
Notes: Estimation method: First Differences. The dependent variable is bilateral
exports scaled by exporter’s GDP and importer’s expenditure. Cluster-robust t-
statistics are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively. All regressions include time effects and controls for common membership
in the euro zone and in an RTA (all not shown).
slightly higher than in table 3; compare columns (1) and (2). The coefficient on the
interaction term is positive, but significant only at the 15% level.29 A reason could
be that we do not take into account the importance of the manufacturing sector for
a country’s competitiveness. An easy way to do so is to include country-and-time
effects. We have seen that the presence of country-and-time effects in a sample for
total-economy-wide unit labor costs renders the coefficient on bilateral cost diver-
gence insignificant and reverses the signs of importer misalignment and multilateral
misalignment; see table 7. The same happens in the sample with manufacturing
labor costs. Importantly, the interaction terms enters significantly in column (4),
which lends support on our main hypothesis.
29The p-value is 0.122.
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Table 7: Misalignment channel: Country-and-time effects
σ = 5 σ = 10
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bilateral cost 0.0908 0.132 0.0554 0.0997
divergence (β0) (0.71) (0.96) (0.44) (0.73)
Euro-induced -0.332∗ -0.346∗
misalign. (β1) (-1.72) (-1.80)
Importer 0.318∗ 0.306∗ 0.184 0.177
misalign. (γ1) (1.74) (1.69) (1.21) (1.16)
Multilateral -0.0495 -0.0453 0.00155 0.00281
misalign. (γ2) (-0.99) (-0.90) (0.09) (0.16)
Both in euro -0.0147 -0.0147 -0.0147 -0.0147
zone (α) (-0.39) (-0.39) (-0.39) (-0.39)
Both in RTA (̺) -0.0718 -0.0718 -0.0718 -0.0718
(-1.41) (-1.40) (-1.38) (-1.37)
N 4560 4560 4560 4560
R2 0.352 0.352 0.351 0.352
Notes: Estimation method: First Differences. The dependent variable is
bilateral exports scaled by exporter’s GDP and importer’s expenditure.
Cluster-robust t-statistics are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate sig-
nificance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. All regressions include country-
and-time effects (all not shown).
5 Summary and concluding comments
Joining a currency union involves a cost in that it implies the loss of an independent
monetary policy. Having lost monetary autonomy, some countries might find it dif-
ficult to absorb macroeconomic shocks in ways that are consistent with the common
nominal anchor set by the common monetary policy. In the case of the euro, it also
implies enforced stress on fiscal discipline and rules of conduct. Facing these costs,
countries that join a currency area will always hope for a boost in intra-union trade
that might compensate for the hardships.
The literature to date has tried to estimate the trade effect of common curren-
cies without any reference to macroeconomic imbalances caused by monetary union.
In this paper, we argue that this is a problem. Loss of monetary autonomy im-
plies that divergence in nominal cost competitiveness cannot be absorbed through
39
Table 8: Misalignment channel: Manufacturing unit labor costs
Time effects Country-and-time
effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bilateral cost -0.342∗∗∗ -0.303∗∗∗ 0.102 0.143
divergence (β0) (-4.16) (-3.49) (1.05) (1.39)
Euro-induced -0.194 -0.212∗
misalign. (β1) (-1.55) (-1.78)
Importer -0.511∗∗∗ -0.513∗∗∗ 0.380∗∗ 0.374∗∗
misalign. (γ1) (-5.31) (-5.33) (2.27) (2.24)
Multilateral 0.00073 0.00234 -0.0766∗ -0.0729∗
misalign. (γ2) (0.03) (0.1) (-1.83) (-1.74)
Price index (δ) 2.636∗∗∗ 2.631∗∗∗
(3.01) (3.00)
Both in euro 0.0249 0.0249 -0.0147 -0.0147
zone (α) (1.08) (1.09) (-0.39) (-0.39)
Both in RTA (̺) -0.0501 -0.0501 -0.0718 -0.0718
(-1.24) (-1.20) (-1.45) (-1.43)
Notes: Estimation method: First Differences. The dependent variable is bi-
lateral exports scaled by exporter’s GDP and importer’s expenditure. Cluster-
robust t-statistics are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at 1%,
5%, and 10%, respectively. All regressions include country-and-time effects (all
not shown).
nominal exchange rate movements, which may lead to misalignments of real ex-
change rates. Such misalignments, in turn, trigger sizable trade effects. Specifically,
countries with deteriorating labor cost competitiveness face a decrease in their ex-
ports to countries better able to observe the macroeconomic restriction of common
nominal anchor. The overall trade effect then emerges from a combination of the
conventional microeconomic channel that operates through savings in trade cost,
and a macroeconomic channel driven by multiple misalignments of bilateral real
exchange rates. The macroeconomic channel introduces substantial heterogeneity
across member countries in the trade effects generated by the common currency.
This heterogeneity is masked by uniform estimates based on the microeconomic
channel alone.
We develop an extended gravity equation, which allows us to disentangle the mi-
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croeconomic and the macroeconomic channels for trade effects of a common currency
in a unified framework. We define trade effects from the microeconomic channel as
shifts in what we call the “gravity norm” bilateral trade volumes, and macroeconomic
effects as deviations from this norm, arising because lack of nominal exchange rate
adjustments causes implicit under- or overvaluations of the common currency. Our
empirical strategy for bringing this model to the data involves two steps. In step one
we identify the microeconomic channel, which also allows us to compute unobserved
gravity norm levels of trade. In step two, we use these computations in order to esti-
mate the full “misalignment-augmented” gravity equation which includes a nominal
cost-divergence term for any two trading partners as an explanatory variable. Of
crucial importance, we interact this term with the dummy-variable indicating euro
membership, in order to test the key hypothesis that such divergence has different
implications for trade between euro-area member countries, compared to countries
that have independent currencies and, thus, the option of nominal exchange rate
adjustment.
Our results from applying this setup to the euro area confirm the aforementioned
worries. Implicit misalignment is found to exert a significant influence on bilateral
exports for euro-area countries. In particular, we find an increase in the misalign-
ment index (representing implicit overvaluation of the currency) by 10% to reduce
exports between 2.5% and 9% on average. Furthermore, in line with existing lit-
erature, we do not find strong evidence of a positive trade cost effect of the euro.
Combining our estimates for the macroeconomic channel with the actual develop-
ments of bilateral misalignments since the start of the currency union, a disaggregate
picture emerges which reveals substantial country heterogeneity. For Germany, the
trade effects came about asymmetrically from euro-induced misalignment, boosting
exports beyond the gravity norm, while boosting imports beyond this norm (and
reducing exports below) for most of the other members of the euro zone. Indeed,
our results indicate that in the recent history of the euro, these misalignment effects
have dwarfed the conventional effects running through the trade cost channel. Fur-
thermore, the resulting differential export performances across euro members are
likely to have contributed to the build up of important macroeconomic imbalances
between them.
In a broader perspective, we see three important conclusions from our study.
First, given the empirical significance of the currency misalignment channel, coun-
tries considering to join the euro, or any other currency union, should not expect a
sizable and balanced increase in their exports and imports to and from other union
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members. Most of the trade effects will depend of their relative competitiveness
performance. Moreover, they are likely to be affected by “implicit currency mis-
alignment” that derives from asymmetric shocks, or from asymmetric mechanisms
of nominal shock absorption, in the face of a common nominal anchor. Even if a
certain country expects to remain in line with the nominal anchor which is set by
the union monetary policy, it will still be affected by other countries’ inability, or
unwillingness, to do the same. Secondly, a low effect of the euro on quantities traded
does not mean that there are no cost-savings from introducing the euro. The larger
part of cost savings operates not through additional trade, but through less costly
transactions in existing trade volumes, i.e., through first order “rectangular” welfare
effects. Finally, countries should avoid falling victim to mercantilistic thought when
contemplating entry into the euro area. From a static welfare perspective, asym-
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A Description of simulation exercise
Real bilateral trade costs can be decomposed into (i) time-varying and (ii) time-
invariant elements. Clearly, common membership in the euro area varies over time.
Our estimation results suggest that the euro has no significant effect on real trade
costs. We can therefore ignore common membership in the euro area when con-
structing the matrix of real bilateral trade costs. Typically, common membership in
a regional trade agreement (RTA) is time-varying, too. Beyond the European Union
(EU), our sample comprises the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
and the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA), which came into
force in 1994 and 2005, respectively.30
Time-invariant elements of bilateral trade costs may comprise geographical dis-
tance and dummies for contiguity, common language, colonial ties, common legal
origin, and common membership in EU and NAFTA. We obtain the corresponding
trade cost elasticities from regressing the pair dummies on the time-invariant trade
cost determinants along with sets of exporter and importer fixed effects and dividing
the coefficients through (1 − σ) to get rid of the trade elasticity.
Table 9 reports the results for σ = 5 (our benchmark specification) and σ = 10.31
Distance enters positively as a larger distance rises bilateral trade costs. Contigu-
ity, sharing the legal origin, and being a EU member reduce bilateral trade costs.
Common language and NAFTA membership do not lead to a significant drop in real
trade costs.





θh(1 − zh), (34)
where θ0 is the elasticity of trade costs in distance (Dist) and θh is the corresponding
semi-elasticity corresponding to binary trade cost components zh.
Given symmetry of bilateral trade costs, Tij = Tji, equation (11) describes a
system of 20 equations, which require information on the gravity norm GDP shares
s̃i = Ỹi/
∑
i Ỹi. Equation (17) implies Ỹit = YitEi1t/(ǫitmi1t). YitEi1t is actual
GDP in US dollar which we take from CEPII. Data on nominal cost conditions
30As our sample starts in 1995, the RTA dummy in stage one only absorbs variation in joint
AUSFTA membership, while joint EU and NAFTA membership is captured by country pair fixed
effects.
31As a memo, the last column contains the untransformed estimated coefficients.
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Table 9: Trade cost elasticities
(1) (2) (3)
σ = 5 σ = 10 Memo
Both in EU -0.413∗∗∗ -0.184∗∗∗ 1.653∗∗∗
(-6.80) (-6.80) (6.80)
Both in NAFTA -0.0638 -0.0284 0.255
(-0.82) (-0.82) (0.82)
Distance 0.123∗∗∗ 0.0545∗∗∗ -0.491∗∗∗
(5.28) (5.28) (-5.28)
Contiguity -0.109∗∗∗ -0.0486∗∗∗ 0.438∗∗∗
(-3.10) (-3.10) (3.10)
Common language 0.013 0.0058 -0.0522
(0.44) (0.44) (-0.44)
Colonial ties 0.085 0.0378 -0.34
(0.91) (0.91) (-0.91)
Common legal origin -0.119∗∗∗ -0.0530∗∗∗ 0.477∗∗∗
(-6.77) (-6.77) (6.77)
N 343 343 343
R2 0.988 0.988 0.988
Notes: Estimates obtained from regressing pair dummy coeffients received from
estimation of equation (29) on time-invariant trade cost components and di-
viding through (1 − σ). The last column reports the untransformed coeffi-
cients. Note that 37 pair dummies are in the estimation of equation (29)
due to collinearity. All regressions include exporter and importer fixed effects.
Cluster-robust t-statistics are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance
at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
and employment ratios stem from the OECD. With the data at hand, we compute
gravity norm GDP shares and numerically solve for gravity norm price indices.
Using equation (8), we compute the gravity norm mass of firms Ñit up to the time-
invariant multiplier (p̃i)
1−σ = c(wi1)/ρ. Then, the actual mass of firms follows from
equation (16). Having these figures at hand, we can use equation (14) to compute
the multilateral misalignment term µit. Table 10 reports the results of regression
multilateral misalignment on all other regressors. In all regressions, the R2µ is “close”
to one. Hence, multilateral misalignment has a strong linear relationship to the
other regressors, which translates into an estimated standard error that is too large.
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Table 10: The dependence of multilateral misalignment on other regressors
(1) (2) (3)
Total economy Manuf.
σ = 5 σ = 10 σ = 5
Bilateral cost divergence 0.621∗∗∗ 1.483∗∗∗ 0.717∗∗∗
(13.49) (14.51) (16.72)
Importer misalignment 2.457∗∗∗ 4.781∗∗∗ 2.174∗∗∗
(43.01) (37.18) (36.03)
Price index -1.114∗∗∗ -1.114∗∗∗ -0.533
(-2.66) (-8.09) (-1.08)
Both in euro zone -0.00177 -0.0153 -0.0104∗∗
(-0.41) (-1.65) (-2.19)
Both in RTA 0.0135 -0.0205 -0.0217
(0.48) (-0.13) (-0.71)
Year 1996 0.0356∗∗∗ 0.450∗∗∗ 0.0471∗∗∗
(5.97) (32.85) (7.04)
Year 1997 0.0171 0.566∗∗∗ 0.0177
(1.51) (36.26 (1.32)
Year 1998 0.0337∗∗∗ 0.406∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗
(3.46) (25.85 (10.86)
Year 1999 0.0438∗∗∗ 0.453∗∗∗ 0.0545∗∗∗
(4.51) (26.57 (4.55)
Year 2000 -0.117∗∗∗ -0.0669∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗
(-7.60) (-2.65) (-9.71)
Year 2001 0.00206 0.295∗∗∗ -0.0372∗∗∗
(0.26) (22.54) (-3.02)
Year 2002 0.113∗∗∗ 0.620∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗
(20.59) (31.89) (31.84)
Year 2003 0.217∗∗∗ 0.885∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗
(22.97) (28.82) (21.88)
Year 2004 0.128∗∗∗ 0.599∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗
(21.14) (30.83) (24.69
Year 2005 -0.0112∗ 0.189∗∗∗ -0.0351∗∗∗
(-1.90) (16.17) (-4.61)
Year 2006 -0.0437∗∗∗ 0.0219∗ -0.0697∗∗∗
(-7.15) (1.92) (-7.31)
N 4560 4560 4560
R2µ 0.942 0.924 0.919
Notes: Estimation method: First Differences. The dependent variable is mul-
tilateral misalignment. Cluster-robust t-statistics are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗,
and ∗ indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. All regressions
include a constant (not shown).
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